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Abstract
In this paper, we give an operational and denotational semantics for a meta-language of the 3APL agent programming language.
With this meta-language, various 3APL interpreters can be programmed. We prove equivalence of the operational and denota-
tional semantics. Furthermore, we give an operational semantics for object-level 3APL. Using this semantics, we relate the 3APL
meta-language to object-level 3APL by providing a speciﬁc interpreter, the semantics of which will prove to be equivalent to object-
level 3APL.
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1. Introduction
An agent is commonly seen as an encapsulated computer system that is situated in some environment and that is
capable of ﬂexible, autonomous action in that environment in order to meet its design objectives [19]. Autonomy
means that an agent encapsulates its state and makes decisions about what to do based on this state, without the direct
intervention of humans or others. Agents are situated in some environment which can change during the execution
of the agent. This requires ﬂexible problem solving behaviour, i.e., the agent should be able to respond adequately
to changes in its environment. Programming ﬂexible computing entities is not a trivial task. Consider for example a
standard procedural language. The assumption in these languages is that the environment does not change while some
procedure is executing. If problems do occur during the execution of a procedure, the program might throw an excep-
tion and terminate (see also [20]). This works well for many applications, but we need something more if change is the
norm and not the exception.
A philosophical view that is well recognized in the AI literature is that rational behaviour can be explained in terms
of the concepts of beliefs, goals and plans 1 [2,13,3]. This view has been taken up within the AI community in the
sense that it might be possible to program ﬂexible, autonomous agents using these concepts. The idea is that an agent
tries to fulﬁll its goals by selecting appropriate plans, depending on its beliefs about the world. Beliefs should thus
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represent the world or environment of the agent; the goals represent the state of the world the agent wants to realize and
plans are the means to achieve these goals. When programming in terms of these concepts, beliefs can be compared
to the program state, plans can be compared to statements, i.e., plans constitute the procedural part of the agent, and
goals can be viewed as the (desired) postconditions of executing the statement or plan. Through executing a plan, the
world and therefore the beliefs reﬂecting the world will change and this execution should have the desired result, i.e.,
achievement of goals.
This view has been adopted by the designers of the agent programming language 3APL 2 [7]. The dynamic parts of
a 3APL agent thus consist of a set of beliefs, a plan 3 and a set of goals. 4 A plan can consist of sequences of so-called
basic actions and abstract plans. Basic actions change the beliefs 5 if executed and abstract plans can be compared to
procedure names. To provide for the possibility of programming ﬂexible behaviour, so-called plan revision rules were
added to the language. These rules can be compared to procedures in the sense that they have a head (the procedure
name) and a body (a plan or statement). The operational meaning of plan revision rules is similar to that of procedures:
if the procedure name or head is encountered in a statement or plan, this name or head is replaced by the body of
the procedure or rule, respectively (see [1] for the operational semantics of procedure calls). The difference however
is that the head in a plan revision rule can be any plan (or statement) and not just a procedure name. In procedural
languages it is furthermore usually assumed that procedure names are distinct. In 3APL however, it is possible that
multiple rules are applicable at the same time. This provides for very general and ﬂexible plan revision capabilities,
which is a distinguishing feature of 3APL compared to other agent programming languages [12,16,6].
As argued, we consider these general plan revision capabilities to be an essential part of agenthood. The introduction
of these capabilities now gives rise to interesting issues concerning the semantics of plan execution, the exploration of
which is the topic of this paper.
Semantics of plan execution can be considered on two levels. On the one hand, the semantics of object-level 3APL
can be studied as a function yielding the result of executing a plan on an initial belief base, where the plan can be revised
through plan revision rules during execution. An interesting question is whether a denotational semantic function can
be deﬁned that is compositional in its plan argument.
On the other hand, the semantics of a 3APL interpreter language or meta-language can be studied, where a plan
and a belief base are considered the data on which the interpreter or meta-program operates. This meta-language is the
main focus of this paper. To be more speciﬁc, we deﬁne a meta-language and provide an operational and denotational
semantics for it. These will be proven equivalent. We furthermore deﬁne a very general interpreter in this language, the
semantics of which will prove to be equivalent to the semantics of object-level 3APL.
For regular procedural programming languages, studying a speciﬁc interpreter language is in general not very
interesting. In the context of agent programming languages it however is, for several reasons. First of all, 3APL and
agent-oriented programming languages in general are non-deterministic by nature. In the case of 3APL for example,
it will often occur that several plan revision rules are applicable at the same time. Choosing a rule for application (or
choosing whether to execute an action from the plan or to apply a rule if both are possible) is the task of a 3APL
interpreter. The choices made affect the outcome of the execution of the agent. In the context of agents, it is interesting
to study various interpreters, as different interpreters will give rise to different agent types. An interpreter that for
example always executes a rule if possible, thereby deferring action execution, will yield a thoughtful and passive
agent. In a similar way, very bold agents can be constructed or agents with characteristics anywhere on this spectrum.
These conceptual ideas about various agent types ﬁt well within the agent metaphor and therefore it is worthwhile to
study an interpreter language and the interpreters that can be programmed in it (see also [4]).
Secondly, as pointed out by Hindriks [8], differences between various agent languages often mainly come down to
differences in their meta-level reasoning cycle or interpreter. To provide for a comparison between languages, it is thus
important to separate the semantic speciﬁcation of object-level and meta-level execution.
Finally, and this was the original motivation for this work, we hope that the speciﬁcation of a denotational semantics
for the meta-language might shed some light onto the issue of specifying a denotational semantics for object-level
2 3APL is to be pronounced as “triple-a-p-l”.
3 In the original version this was a set of plans.
4 The addition of goals was a recent extension [14].
5 A change in the environment is a possible “side effect” of the execution of a basic action.
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3APL. It however seems, contrary to what one might think that the denotational semantics of the meta-language cannot
be used to deﬁne a denotational semantics for object-level 3APL. We will elaborate on this issue in Section 6.2.
2. Syntax
2.1. Object-level
As stated in the introduction, the latest version of 3APL incorporates beliefs, goals and plans. In this paper, we will
however consider a version of 3APL with only beliefs and plans as was deﬁned in [7]. The reason is that in this paper we
focus on the semantics of plan execution, for the treatment of which only beliefs and plans will sufﬁce. The language
deﬁned in [7] is a ﬁrst-order language, a propositional and otherwise slightly simpliﬁed version of which we will use in
this paper.
In the sequel, a language deﬁned by inclusion shall be the smallest language containing the speciﬁed elements.
Deﬁnition 1 (belief bases). Assume a propositional language L with typical formula  and the connectives ∧ and ¬
with the usual meaning. Then the set of possible belief bases  with typical element  is deﬁned to be ℘(L).
Deﬁnition 2 (plans). Assume that a set BasicAction with typical element a is given, together with a set AbstractPlan.
The symbol E denotes the empty plan. Then the set of plans  with typical element  is deﬁned as follows:
• {E} ∪ BasicAction ∪ AbstractPlan ⊆ ,
• if c ∈ ({E} ∪ BasicAction ∪ AbstractPlan) and  ∈  then c ;  ∈ . 6
A plan E;  is identiﬁed with the plan .
For reasons of presentation and technical convenience we exclude non-deterministic choice and test from plans.
This is no fundamental restriction as non-determinism is introduced by plan revision rules (to be introduced below).
Furthermore, tests can be modelled as basic actions that do not affect the state if executed (for semantics of basic actions
see Deﬁnition 8).
A plan and a belief base can together constitute the so-called mental state of a 3APL agent. A mental state can be
compared to what is usually called a conﬁguration in procedural languages, i.e., a statement-state pair.
Deﬁnition 3 (mental states). Let  be the set of belief bases and let  be the set of plans. Then ×  is the set S of
possible mental states of a 3APL agent.
Deﬁnition 4 (plan revision (PR) rules). A PR rule  is a triple h |  b such that  ∈ L, h, b ∈  and h = E.
Deﬁnition 5 (3APL agent). A 3APL agentA is a tuple 〈0, 0,BasicAction,AbstractPlan,Rule, T 〉 where 〈0, 0〉 is
the initial mental state, BasicAction,AbstractPlan and Rule are ﬁnite sets of basic actions, abstract plans and PR rules,
respectively, and T : (BasicAction × ) →  is a partial function, deﬁning belief update through action execution.
In the following, when referring to agent A, we will assume this agent to have a set of basic actions BasicAction, a
set of abstract plans AbstractPlan, a set of PR rules Rule and a belief update function T .
2.2. Meta-level
In this section, we deﬁne the meta-language that can be used to write 3APL interpreters. The programs that can
be written in this language will be called meta-programs. Like regular imperative programs, these programs are state
transformers. The kind of states they transform however do not simply consist of an assignment of values to variables
like in regular imperative programming, but the states that are transformed are 3APL mental states. In Section 3.2, we
6 For technical convenience, plans are deﬁned to have a list structure.
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will deﬁne the transition system with which we will deﬁne the operational semantics of our meta-programs. We will
do this using the concept of a meta-conﬁguration. A meta-conﬁguration consists of a meta-program and a mental state,
i.e., the meta-program is the procedural part and the mental state is the “data” on which the meta-program operates.
The basic elements of meta-programs are the execute action and the apply() action (called meta-actions). The
execute action is used to specify that a basic action from the plan of an agent should be executed. The apply() action
is used to specify that a PR rule  should be applied to the plan. Composite meta-programs can be constructed in a
standard way.
Below, the meta-programs and meta-conﬁgurations for agent A are deﬁned.
Deﬁnition 6 (meta-programs). We assume a set Bexp of boolean expressions with typical element b. Let b ∈ Bexp
and  ∈ Rule, then the set Prog of meta-programs with typical element P is deﬁned as follows:
P ::= execute | apply() | while b do P od | P1;P2 | P1 + P2.
Deﬁnition 7 (meta-conﬁgurations). Let Prog be the set of meta-programs and let S be the set of mental states. Then
Prog × S is the set of possible meta-conﬁgurations.
3. Operational semantics
In [7], the operational semantics of 3APL is deﬁned using transition systems [11]. A transition system for a pro-
gramming language consists of a set of derivation rules for deriving transitions for this language. A transition is a
transformation of one conﬁguration into another and it corresponds to a single computation step. In the following
section, we will repeat the transition system for 3APL given in [7] (adapted to ﬁt our simpliﬁed language) and we will
call it the object-level transition system. We will furthermore give a transition system for the meta-programs deﬁned in
Section 2.2 (the meta-level transition system). Then in the last section, we will deﬁne the operational semantics of the
object- and meta-programs using the deﬁned transition systems.
3.1. Object-level transition system
The transition systems deﬁned in this and the following section assume 3APL agent A. The object-level transition
system (Transo) is deﬁned by the rules given below. The transitions are labelled to denote the kind of transition.
Deﬁnition 8 (action execution). Let a ∈ BasicAction.
T (a, ) = ′
〈a; , 〉 →execute 〈, ′〉
In the next deﬁnition, we use the operator •. The statement 1 • 2 denotes a plan of which 1 is the ﬁrst part and 2
is the second, i.e., 1 is the preﬁx of this plan. We need this operator because plans are deﬁned to have a list structure
(see Deﬁnition 2).
Deﬁnition 9 (rule application). Let  : h |  b ∈ Rule

〈h • , 〉 →apply() 〈b • , 〉
3.2. Meta-level transition system
The meta-level transition system (Transm) is deﬁned by the rules below, specifying which transitions from one meta-
conﬁguration to another are possible. As for the object-level transition system, the transitions are labelled to denote the
kind of transition.
An execute meta-action is used to execute a basic action. It can thus only be executed in a mental state, if the ﬁrst
element of the plan in that mental state is a basic action. As in the object-level transition system, the basic action a
must be executable and the result of executing a on belief base  is deﬁned using the function T . After executing the
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meta-action execute, the meta-program is empty and the basic action is gone from the plan. Furthermore, the belief
base is changed as deﬁned through T .
Deﬁnition 10 (action execution). Let a ∈ BasicAction
T (a, ) = ′
〈execute, (a; , )〉 →execute 〈E, (, ′)〉 .
A meta-action apply() is used to specify that PR rule  should be applied. It can be executed in a mental state if 
is applicable in that mental state. The execution of the meta-action in a mental state results in the plan of that mental
state being changed as speciﬁed by the rule.
Deﬁnition 11 (rule application). Let  : h |  b ∈ Rule.

〈apply(), (h • , )〉 →apply() 〈E, (b • , )〉
In order to deﬁne the transition rule for the while construct, we ﬁrst need to specify the semantics of boolean
expressions Bexp.
Deﬁnition 12 (semantics of boolean expressions). We assume a function W of type Bexp → (S → W) yielding the
semantics of boolean expressions, where W is the set of truth values {tt, ff } with typical formula .
The transition for the while construct is then deﬁned in a standard way below. The transition is labelled with idle,
to denote that this is a transition that does not have a counterpart in the object-level transition system.
Deﬁnition 13 (while).
W(b)(s)
〈while b do P od, s〉 →idle 〈P ; while b do P od, s〉
¬W(b)(s)
〈while b do P od, s〉 →idle 〈E, s〉
The transitions for sequential composition and non-deterministic choice are deﬁned as follows in a standard way.
The variable x is used to pass on the type of transition through the derivation.
Deﬁnition 14 (sequential composition). Let x ∈ {execute, apply(), idle |  ∈ Rule}.
〈P1, s〉 →x 〈P ′1, s′〉
〈P1;P2, s〉 →x 〈P ′1;P2, s′〉
Deﬁnition 15 (non-deterministic choice). Let x ∈ {execute, apply(), idle |  ∈ Rule}.
〈P1, s〉 →x 〈P ′1, s′〉
〈P1 + P2, s〉 →x 〈P ′1, s′〉
〈P2, s〉 →x 〈P ′2, s′〉
〈P1 + P2, s〉 →x 〈P ′2, s′〉
3.3. Operational semantics
Using the transition systems deﬁned in the previous section, transitions can be derived for 3APL and for the meta-
programs. Individual transitions can be put in sequel, yielding so called computation sequences. In the following
deﬁnitions, we deﬁne computation sequences and we specify the functions yielding these sequences, for the object-
and meta-level transition systems. We also deﬁne the function , yielding the last element of a computation sequence
if this sequence is ﬁnite and the special state ⊥ otherwise. These functions will be used to deﬁne the operational
semantics.
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Deﬁnition 16 (computation sequences). The sets S+ and S∞ of, respectively, ﬁnite and inﬁnite computation sequences
are deﬁned as follows:
S+ = {s1, . . . , si , . . . , sn | si ∈ S, 1 in, n ∈ N},
S∞ = {s1, . . . , si , . . . | si ∈ S, i ∈ N}.
Let S⊥ = S ∪ {⊥} and 	 ∈ S+ ∪ S∞. The function  : (S+ ∪ S∞) → S⊥ is deﬁned by
(	) =
{
last element of 	 if 	 ∈ S+,
⊥ otherwise.
The function  is extended to handle sets of computation sequences as follows: ({	i | i ∈ I }) = {(	i ) | i ∈ I }.
Deﬁnition 17 (functions for calculating computation sequences). The functions Co and Cm are, respectively, of type
S → ℘(S+ ∪ S∞) and Prog → (S → ℘(S+ ∪ S∞)).
Co(s) = {s1, . . . , sn ∈ ℘(S+) | s →t1 s1 →t2 · · · →tn 〈E, n〉
is a ﬁnite sequence of transitions in Transo} ∪
{s1, . . . , si , . . . ∈ ℘(S∞) | s →t1 s1 →t2 · · · →ti si →ti+1 . . .
is an inﬁnite sequence of transitions in Transo}
Cm(P )(s) = {s1, . . . , sn ∈ ℘(S+) | 〈P, s〉 →x1 〈P1, s1〉 →x2 · · · →xn 〈E, sn〉
is a ﬁnite sequence of transitions in Transm} ∪
{s1, . . . , si , . . . ∈ ℘(S∞) | 〈P, s〉 →x1 〈P1, s1〉 →x2 · · · →xi 〈Pi, si〉 →xi+1 · · ·
is an inﬁnite sequence of transitions in Transm}.
Note that both Co and Cm return sequences of mental states. Co just returns the mental states comprising the sequences
of transitions derived in Transo, whereas Cm removes the meta-program component of the meta-conﬁgurations of the
transition sequences derived in Transm. The reason for deﬁning these functions in this way is that we want to prove
equivalence of the object- and meta-level transition systems: both yield the same transition sequences with respect to
the mental states (or that is for a certain meta-program, see Section 4). Also note that for Co as well as for Cm, we only
take into account inﬁnite sequences and successfully terminating sequences, i.e., those sequences ending in a mental
state or meta-conﬁguration with an empty plan or meta-program, respectively.
The operational semantics of object- and meta-level programs are functions Oo and Om, yielding, for each mental
state s and possibly meta-program P, a set of mental states corresponding to the ﬁnal states reachable through executing
the plan of s or executing the meta-program P, respectively. If there is an inﬁnite execution path, the set of mental states
will contain the element ⊥.
Deﬁnition 18 (operational semantics). Let s ∈ S. The functions Oo and Om are, respectively, of type S⊥ → ℘(S⊥)
and Prog → (S⊥ → ℘(S⊥)).
Oo(s) = (Co(s)),
Om(P )(s) = (Cm(P )(s)),
Oo(⊥) = Om(P )(⊥) = {⊥}.
Note that the operational semantic functions can take any state s ∈ S⊥, including ⊥, as input. This will turn out to
be necessary for giving the equivalence result of Section 6.
4. Equivalence of Oo and Om
In the previous section, we have deﬁned the operational semantics for 3APL and for meta-programs. Using the
meta-language, one can write various 3APL interpreters. Here we will consider an interpreter of which the operational
semantics will prove to be equivalent to the object-level operational semantics of 3APL. This interpreter for agent A
is deﬁned by the following meta-program.
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Deﬁnition 19 (interpreter). Let ⋃ni=1 i = Rule, s ∈ S and let notEmptyPlan ∈ Bexp be a boolean expression such
that W(notEmptyPlan)(s) = tt if the plan component of s is not equal to E and W(notEmptyPlan)(s) = ff otherwise.
Then the interpreter can be deﬁned as follows:
while notEmptyPlan do (execute + apply(1) + · · · + apply(n)) od.
In the sequel, we will use the keyword interpreter to abbreviate this meta-program.
This interpreter thus iterates the execution of a non-deterministic choice between all basic meta-actions, until the plan
component of themental state is empty. Intuitively, if there is a possibility for the interpreter to execute somemeta-action
in mental state s, resulting in a changed state s′, it is also possible to go from s to s′ in an object-level execution through
a corresponding object-level transition.At each iteration, an executable meta-action is non-deterministically chosen for
execution. The interpreter thus, as it were, non-deterministically chooses a path through the object-level transition tree.
The possible transitions deﬁned by this interpreter correspond to the possible transitions in the object-level transition
system and therefore the object-level operational semantics is equivalent to the meta-level operational semantics of this
meta-program. 7
We prove the equivalence result by proving a weak bisimulation between Transo and Transm(interpreter), which
are deﬁned assuming agent A (see the text below Deﬁnition 5 and Section 3.1). From this, we can then prove that Oo
and Om(interpreter) are equivalent. In order to do this, we ﬁrst state the following proposition. It follows immediately
from the transition systems.
Proposition 1 (object-level versus meta-level transitions).
s →execute s′ is a transition in Transo ⇔
〈execute, s〉 →execute 〈E, s′〉 is a transition in Transm
s →apply() s′ is a transition in Transo ⇔
〈apply(), s〉 →apply() 〈E, s′〉 is a transition in Transm
A weak bisimulation between two transition systems in general, is a relation between the systems such that the
following holds: if a transition step can be derived in system one, it should be possible to derive a “similar” (sequence
of) transition(s) in system two and if a transition step can be derived in system two, it should be possible to derive
a “similar” (sequence of) transition(s) in system one. To explain what we mean by “similar” transitions, we need the
notion of an idle transition. In a transition system, certain kinds of transitions can be labelled as an idle transition, for
example transitions derived using the while rule (Deﬁnition 13). These transitions can be considered “implementation
details” of a certain transition system and we do not want to take these into account when studying the relation between
this and another transition system. A non-idle transition in system one now is similar to a sequence of transitions in
system two if the following holds: this sequence of transitions in system two should consist of one non-idle transition
and otherwise idle transitions, and the non-idle transition in this sequence should be similar to the transition in system
one, i.e., the relevant elements of the conﬁgurations involved, should match.
In the context of our transition systems Transo and Transm, we can now phrase the following bisimulation lemma.
Lemma 1 (weak bisimulation). Let +∗ abbreviate (execute+ apply(1)+· · ·+ apply(n)). Let Transm(P ) be the re-
striction of Transm to those transitions that are part of some sequence of transitions starting in initial
meta-conﬁguration 〈P, s0〉, with s0 ∈ S an arbitrary mental state and let t ∈ {execute, apply() |  ∈ Rule}.
Then a weak bisimulation exists between Transo and Transm(interpreter), i.e., the following properties hold.
s →t s′ is a transition in Transo ⇒1
〈interpreter, s〉 →idle 〈+∗; interpreter, s〉 →t 〈interpreter, s′〉
is a transition in Transm(interpreter)
7 The result only holds if PR rules of the form E |  b are excluded from the set of rules under consideration, as was speciﬁed in Deﬁnition 4.
A relaxation of this condition would call for a slightly different interpreter to yield the equivalence result. For reasons of space and clarity, we will
however not discuss this possibility here.
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〈+∗; interpreter, s〉 →t 〈interpreter, s′〉
is a transition in Transm(interpreter) ⇒2
s →t s′is a transition in Transo
Proof. (⇒1) Assume s →t s′ is a transition in Transo for t ∈ {execute, apply() |  ∈ Rule}. Using Proposition 1, the
following then is a transition in Transm:
〈(execute + apply(1) + · · · + apply(n)); interpreter, s〉 →t 〈interpreter, s′〉. (1)
Furthermore, by the assumption that s →t s′ is a transition in Transo and by the assumption that no reactive rules
are contained in Rule (see introduction of Section 4), we know that the plan of s is not empty as both rule application
and basic action execution require a non-empty plan. Now, using the fact that the plan of s is not empty, the following
transition can be derived in Transm(interpreter):
〈interpreter, s〉 →idle 〈(execute + apply(1) + · · · + apply(n)); interpreter, s〉. (2)
The transitions (2) and (1) can be concatenated, yielding the desired result.
(⇒2) Assume 〈+∗; interpreter, s〉 →t 〈interpreter, s′〉 is a transition in Transm(interpreter). Then, 〈+∗, s〉 →t
〈E, s′〉 must be a transition in Transm (Deﬁnition 14). Therefore, by Proposition 1, we can conclude that s →t s′ is a
transition in Transo. 
We are now in a position to give the equivalence theorem of this section.
Theorem 1 (Oo = Om(interpreter)).
∀s ∈ S : Oo(s) = Om(interpreter)(s).
Proof. As equivalence of object-level and meta-level operational semantics holds for input state ⊥ by Deﬁnition 18,
we will only need to prove equivalence for input states s ∈ S. Proving this theorem amounts to showing the following:
s ∈ Oo ⇔ s ∈ Om(interpreter).
(⇒) Assume s ∈ Oo. This means that a sequence of transitions s0 →t1 · · · →tn s must be derivable in Transo. By
repeated application of Lemma 1, we know that then there must also be a sequence of transitions in Transm(interpreter)
of the following form:
〈interpreter, s0〉 →idle · · · →tn−1 〈interpreter, s′〉 →idle 〈+∗; interpreter, s′〉 →tn 〈interpreter, s〉. (3)
As s ∈ Oo, we know that there cannot be a transition s →tn+1 s′′ for some mental state s′′, i.e., it is not possible to
execute an execute or apply meta-action in s. Therefore, we know that the only possible transition from 〈interpreter, s〉
in (3) above, is · · · →idle 〈E, s〉. From this, we have that s ∈ Om(interpreter).
(⇐) Assume that s ∈ Om(interpreter). Then there must be a sequence of transitions in Transm(interpreter) of the
form:
〈interpreter, s0〉 →idle 〈+∗; interpreter, s0〉 →t1 · · · →tn−1
〈interpreter, s′〉 →idle 〈+∗; interpreter, s′〉 →tn 〈interpreter, s〉 →idle 〈E, s〉.
From this, we can conclude by Lemma 1 that s0 →t1 · · · →tn−1 s′ →tn s → must be a sequence of transitions in
Transo. Therefore, it must be the case that s ∈ Oo. 
Note that it is easy to show that Oo = Om(P ) does not hold for all meta-programs P.
5. Denotational semantics
In this section, we will deﬁne the denotational semantics of meta-programs. The method used is the ﬁxed point
approach as can be found in Stoy [17]. The semantics greatly resembles the one in de Bakker [1, Chapter 7] to which
we refer for a detailed explanation of the subject.
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A denotational semantics for a programming language in general is, like an operational semantics, a function taking
a statement P and a state s and yielding a state (or set of states in case of a non-deterministic language) resulting from
executing P in s. The denotational semantics for meta-programs is thus, like the operational semantics of Deﬁnition 18,
a function taking a meta-program P and mental state s and yielding the set of mental states resulting from executing
P in s, i.e., a function of type Prog → (S⊥ → ℘(S⊥)). 8 Contrary however to an operational semantic function, a
denotational semantic function is not deﬁned using the concept of computation sequences and, in contrast with most
operational semantics, it is deﬁned compositionally [18,10,1].
5.1. Preliminaries
In order to deﬁne the denotational semantics of meta-programs, we need some mathematical machinery. Most
importantly, the domains used in deﬁning the semantics of meta-programs are designed as so-called complete partial
orders (CPOs). A CPO is a set with an ordering on its elements with certain characteristics. This concept is deﬁned
in terms of the notions of partially ordered sets, least upper bounds and chains (see also de Bakker [1] for a rigorous
treatment of the subject).
Deﬁnition 20 (partially ordered set). Let C be an arbitrary set. A partial order  on C is a subset of C × C which
satisﬁes:
(1) c  c (reﬂexivity),
(2) if c1  c2 and c2  c1 then c1 = c2 (antisymmetry),
(3) if c1  c2 and c2  c3 then c1  c3 (transitivity).
In the sequel, we will be concerned not only with arbitrary sets with partial orderings, but also with sets of functions
with an ordering. A partial ordering on a set of functions of type C1 → C2 can be derived from the orderings on C1
and C2 as deﬁned below.
Deﬁnition 21 (partial ordering on functions). Let (C1,1) and (C2,2) be two partially ordered sets. An ordering
 on C1 → C2 is deﬁned as follows, where f, g ∈ C1 → C2:
f  g ⇔ ∀c ∈ C1 : f (c) 2 g(c).
Deﬁnition 22 (least upper bound). Let C′ ⊆ C. z ∈ C is called the least upper bound of C′ if:
(1) z is an upper bound: ∀x ∈ C′ : x  z,
(2) z is the least upper bound: ∀y ∈ C : ((∀x ∈ C′ : x  y) ⇒ z  y).
The least upper bound of a set C′ will be denoted by
⊔
C′.
Deﬁnition 23 (least upper bound of a sequence). The least upper bound of a sequence 〈c0, c1, . . .〉 is denoted
by
⊔∞
i=0 ci or by
⊔〈ci〉∞i=0 and is deﬁned as follows, where “c in 〈ci〉∞i=0” means that c is an element of the sequence
〈ci〉∞i=0:⊔ 〈ci〉∞i=0 =⊔{c | c in 〈ci〉∞i=0}.
Deﬁnition 24 (chains). A chain on (C,) is an inﬁnite sequence 〈ci〉∞i=0 such that for i ∈ N : ci  ci+1.
Having deﬁned partially ordered sets, least upper bounds and chains, we are now in a position to deﬁne complete
partially ordered sets.
8 The type of the denotational semantic function is actually slightly different as will become clear in the sequel, but that is not important for the
current discussion.
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Deﬁnition 25 (CPO). A complete partially ordered set is a set C with a partial order  which satisﬁes the following
requirements:
(1) there is a least element with respect to , i.e., an element ⊥ ∈ C such that ∀c ∈ C : ⊥  c,
(2) each chain 〈ci〉∞i=0 in C has a least upper bound (
⊔∞
i=0 ci) ∈ C.
The semantics of meta-programs will be deﬁned using the notion of the least ﬁxed point of a function on a CPO.
Deﬁnition 26 (least ﬁxed point). Let (C,) a CPO, f : C → C and let x ∈ C.
• x is a ﬁxed point of f iff f (x) = x.
• x is a least ﬁxed point of f iff x is a ﬁxed point of f and for each ﬁxed point y of f: x  y.
The least ﬁxed point of a function f is denoted by 
f .
Finally, we will need the following deﬁnition and fact.
Deﬁnition 27 (continuity). Let (C1,1), (C2,2) be CPOs. Then a function f : C1 → C2 is continuous iff for each














i=0 f i(⊥), where f 0(⊥) = ⊥ and f i+1(⊥) = f (f i(⊥)).
For a proof, see, for example de Bakker [1].
5.2. Deﬁnition
We will now show how the domains used in deﬁning the semantics of meta-programs are designed as CPOs. The
reason for designing these as CPOs will become clear in the sequel.
Deﬁnition 28 (domains of interpretation). Let W be the set of truth values of Deﬁnition 12 and let S be the set of
possible mental states of Deﬁnition 3. Then the sets W⊥ and S⊥ are deﬁned as CPOs as follows:
W⊥ = W ∪ {⊥W⊥} CPO by 1  2 iff 1 = ⊥W⊥ or 1 = 2,
S⊥ = S ∪ {⊥} CPO analogously.
Note that we use ⊥ to denote the bottom element of S⊥ and that we use ⊥C for the bottom element of any other set
C. As the set of mental states is extended with a bottom element, we extend the semantics of boolean expressions of
Deﬁnition 12 to a strict function, i.e., yielding ⊥W⊥ for an input state ⊥.
In the deﬁnition of the denotational semantics, we will use an if-then-else function as deﬁned below.
Deﬁnition 29 (if-then-else). Let C be a CPO, c1, c2,⊥C ∈ C and  ∈ W⊥. Then the if-then-else function of type
W⊥ → C is deﬁned as follows:
if  then c1 else c2 fi =
⎧⎨
⎩
c1 if  = tt,
c2 if  = ff ,
⊥C if  = ⊥W⊥ .
Because our meta-language is non-deterministic, the denotational semantics is not a function from states to states,
but a function from states to sets of states. These resulting sets of states can be ﬁnite or inﬁnite. In case of bounded
non-determinism, 9 these inﬁnite sets of states have ⊥ as one of their members. This property may be explained by
viewing the execution of a program as a tree of computations and then using König’s lemma which tells us that a
ﬁnitely-branching tree with inﬁnitely many nodes has at least one inﬁnite path (see [1]). The meta-language is indeed
9 Bounded non-determinism means that at any state during computation, the number of possible next states is ﬁnite.
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bounded non-deterministic, 10 and the result of executing a meta-program P in some state is thus either a ﬁnite set of
states or an inﬁnite set of states containing ⊥. We therefore specify the following domain as the result domain of the
denotational semantic function instead of ℘(S⊥).
Deﬁnition 30 (T ). The set T with typical element  is deﬁned as follows: T = { ∈ ℘(S⊥) |  ﬁnite or ⊥ ∈ }.
The advantage of using T instead of ℘(S⊥) as the result domain is that T can nicely be designed as a CPO with the
following ordering [5].
Deﬁnition 31 (Egli–Milner ordering). Let 1, 2 ∈ T . 1  2 holds iff either ⊥ ∈ 1 and 1 \ {⊥} ⊆ 2, or ⊥ /∈ 1
and 1 = 2. Under this ordering, the set {⊥} is ⊥T .
We are now ready to give the denotational semantics of meta-programs. We will ﬁrst give the deﬁnition and then
justify and explain it.
Deﬁnition 32 (denotational semantics of meta-programs). Let 1,2 : S⊥ → T . Then we deﬁne the following
functions.
ˆ : T → T =  · ⋃
s∈
(s),
1 ◦ 2 : S⊥ → T = s · ˆ1(2(s)).
Let (, ) ∈ S. The denotational semantics of meta-programs M : Prog → (S⊥ → T ) is then deﬁned as follows.
Mexecute(, ) =
{ {(′, ′)} if  = a; ′with a ∈ BasicAction and T (a, ) = ′
∅ otherwise
Mexecute ⊥ = ⊥T
Mapply()(, ) =
{ {(b ◦ ′, )} if  and  = h ◦ ′with  : h |  b ∈ Rule
∅ otherwise
Mapply() ⊥ = ⊥T
Mwhile b do P od = 

MP1;P2 = MP2 ◦ MP1
MP1 + P2 = MP1 ∪ MP2
The function : (S⊥ → T ) → (S⊥ → T ) used above is deﬁned as ·s·ifW(b)(s)then ˆ(MP (s))else {s}fi,
using Deﬁnition 29.
5.2.1. Meta-actions
The semantics of meta-actions is straight forward. The result of executing an execute meta-action in some mental
state s is a set containing the mental state resulting from executing the basic action of the plan of s. The result is empty
if there is no basic action on the plan to execute. The result of executing an apply() meta-action in state s is a set
containing the mental state resulting from applying  in s. If  is not applicable, the result is the empty set.
5.2.2. While
The semantics of the while construct is more involved, but we will only brieﬂy comment on it. For a detailed
treatment, we again refer to de Bakker [1].
What we want to do, is deﬁne a function specifying the semantics of the while construct Mwhile b do P od,
the type of which should be S⊥ → T , in accordance with the type of M. The function should be deﬁned composi-
tionally, i.e., it can only use the semantics of the guard and of the body of the while. This is required for M to be
well-deﬁned.
10 Only a ﬁnite number of rule applications and action executions are possible in any state.
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The requirement of compositionality is satisﬁed, as the semantics is deﬁned to be the least ﬁxed point of the operator
, which is deﬁned in terms of the semantics of the guard and body of the while.
The least ﬁxed point of an operator does not always exist. By the ﬁxed point theorem however (fact 1), we know
that if the operator is continuous (Deﬁnition 27), the least ﬁxed point does exist and is obtainable within  steps. By
proving that  is continuous, we can thus conclude that 
 exists and therefore that M is well-deﬁned.
Theorem 2 (continuity of ). The function  as given in Deﬁnition 32 is continuous.
Proof. See Appendix A. 
Note that in the deﬁnition of, the function  is of type S⊥ → T andMP (s) ∈ T . This  can thus not be applied
directly to this set of states in T, but it must be extended using theˆoperator to be of type T → T .
5.2.3. Sequential composition and non-deterministic choice
The semantics of the sequential composition and non-deterministic choice operator is as one would expect.
6. Equivalence of meta-level operational and denotational semantics
In this section, we will state that the operational semantics for meta-programs is equal to the denotational semantics
for meta-programs and we will relate this to the equivalence result of Section 4. We will furthermore discuss the issue
of deﬁning a denotational semantics for object-level 3APL.
6.1. Equivalence theorem
Theorem 3 (Om = M). Let Om : Prog → (S⊥ → ℘(S⊥)) be the operational semantics of meta-programs
(Deﬁnition 18) and let M : Prog → (S⊥ → T ) be the denotational semantics of meta-programs (Deﬁnition 32).
Then, the following equivalence holds for all meta-programs P ∈ Prog and all mental states s ∈ S⊥.
Om(P )(s) = M(P )(s).
Proof. See Appendix B. 
In Section 4, we stated that the object-level operational semantics of 3APL is equal to the meta-level operational
semantics of the interpreter we speciﬁed in Deﬁnition 19. Above, we then stated that it holds for any meta-program
that its operational semantics is equal to its denotational semantics. This holds in particular for the interpreter of
Deﬁnition 19, i.e., we have the following corollary.
Corollary 1 (Oo = M(interpreter)). From Theorems 1 and 3 we can conclude that the following holds.
Oo = M(interpreter).
6.2. Denotational semantics of object-level 3APL
Corollary 1 states an equivalence between a denotational semantics and the object-level operational semantics for
3APL. The question is, whether this denotational semantics can be called a denotational semantics for object-level
3APL.
A denotational semantics for object-level 3APL should be a function taking a plan and a belief base and returning
the result of executing the plan on this belief base, i.e., a function of type  → (⊥ → ℘(⊥)) or equivalently 11 ,
of type (× ) → ℘(⊥). The type of M(interpreter), i.e., S⊥ → ℘(S⊥), 12 does not match the desired type. This
could however be remedied by deﬁning the following function.
11 For the sake of argument, we for the moment disregard a ⊥⊥ input.
12 M(interpreter) is actually deﬁned to be of type S⊥ → T , but T ⊂ ℘(S⊥), so we may extend the result type to ℘(S⊥).
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Deﬁnition 33 (N ). Let snd be a function yielding the second element, i.e., the belief base, of a mental state in S and
yielding ⊥⊥ for input ⊥. This function is extended to handle sets of mental states through the function ˆ, as was done
in Deﬁnition 32. Then N : S⊥ → ℘(⊥) is deﬁned as follows.
N = s · ŝnd(Minterpreter(s)).
Disregarding a ⊥ input, the function N is of the desired type ( × ) → ℘(⊥). The question now is, whether
it is legitimate to characterize the function N as being a denotational semantics for 3APL. The answer is no, because
a denotational semantic function should be compositional in its program argument, which in this case is . This is
obviously not the case for the function N and therefore this function is not a denotational semantics for 3APL.
So, it seems that the speciﬁcation of the denotational semantics for meta-programs cannot be used to deﬁne a
denotational semantics for object-level 3APL. The difﬁculty of specifying a compositional semantic function is due to
the nature of the PR rules: these rules can transform not just atomic statements, but any sequence of statements. The
semantics of an atomic statement can thus depend on the statements around it. We will illustrate the problem using an
example.
a  b
b; c  d
c  e
Now the question is, how we can deﬁne the semantics of a; c. Can it be deﬁned in terms of the semantics of a and c?
The semantics of a would have to be something involving the semantics of b and the semantics of c something with
the semantics of e, taking into account the PR rules given above. The semantics of a; c should however also be deﬁned
in terms of the semantics of d, because of the second PR rule: a; c can be rewritten to b; c, which can be rewritten
to d. Moreover, if b is not a basic action, the third rule cannot be applied and the semantics of e would be irrelevant.
So, although we do not have a formal proof, it seems that the semantics of the sequential composition operator 13 of a
3APL plan or program cannot be deﬁned using only the semantics of the parts of which the program is composed.
Another way to look at this issue is the following. In a regular procedural program, computation can be deﬁned using
the concept of a program counter. This counter indicates the location in the code of the statement that is to be executed
next or the procedure that is to be called next. If a procedure is called, the program counter jumps to the body of this
procedure. Computation of a 3APL program cannot be deﬁned using such a counter. Consider for example the PR
rules deﬁned above and assume an initial plan a; c. Initially, the program counter would have to be at the start of this
initial plan. Then the ﬁrst PR rule is “called” and the counter jumps to b, i.e., the body of the ﬁrst rule. According to
the semantics of 3APL, it should be possible to get to the body of the second PR rule, as the statement being executed
is b; c. There is however no reason for the program counter to jump from the body of the ﬁrst rule to the body of the
second rule.
7. Related work and conclusion
The concept of a meta-language for programming 3APL interpreters was ﬁrst considered by Hindriks [8]. Our meta-
language is similar to, but simpler than Hindriks’ language. The main difference is that Hindriks includes constructs
for explicit selection of a PR rule from a set of applicable ones. These constructs were not needed in this paper. Dastani
deﬁnes a meta-language for 3APL in [4]. This language is similar to, but more extensive than Hindriks’ language.
Dastani’s main contribution is the deﬁnition of constructs for explicit planning. Using these constructs, the possible
outcomes of a certain sequence of rule applications and action executions can be calculated in advance, thereby providing
the possibility to choose the most beneﬁcial sequence. Contrary to our paper, these papers do not discuss the relation
between object-level and meta-level semantics, nor do they give a denotational semantics for the meta-language.
Concluding, we have proven equivalence of an operational and denotational semantics for a 3APL meta-language.
We furthermore related this 3APL meta-language to object-level 3APL by proving equivalence between the semantics
13 Or actually of the plan concatenation operator •.
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of a speciﬁc interpreter and object-level 3APL. Although these results were obtained for a simpliﬁed 3APL language,
we conjecture that it will not be fundamentally more difﬁcult to obtain similar results for full ﬁrst order 3APL. 14
As argued in the introduction, studying interpreter languages of agent programming languages is important. In the
context of 3APL and PR rules, it is especially interesting to investigate the possibility of deﬁning a denotational or
compositional semantics, for such a compositional semantics could serve as the basis for a (compositional) proof
system. It seems, considering the investigations as described in this paper that it will however be very difﬁcult if not
impossible to deﬁne a denotational semantics for object-level 3APL.As it is possible to deﬁne a denotational semantics
for the meta-language, an important issue for future research will be to investigate the possibility and usefulness of
deﬁning a proof system for the meta-language, using this to prove properties of 3APL agents.
Appendix A. Continuity of 
The function  : (S⊥ → T ) → (S⊥ → T ) from Deﬁnition 32 is deﬁned as follows:
 · s · ifW(b)(s) then ˆ(MP (s)) else {s} fi.
In this section, we prove continuity of this function. The proof is analogous to continuity proofs given in [1]. In
Deﬁnition 27, the concept of continuity was deﬁned. As we will state below in fact 2, an equivalent deﬁnition can be
given using the concept of monotonicity of a function.
Deﬁnition 34 (monotonicity). Let (C,), (C′,) be CPOs and c1, c2 ∈ C. Then a function f : C → C′ is monotone
iff the following holds:
c1  c2 ⇔ f (c1)  f (c2).
Fact 2 (continuity): Let (C,), (C′,) be CPOs and let f : C → C′ be a function. Then



















Proof. For a proof, we refer to [15]. 
Below, we will prove continuity of  by proving that  is monotone and that for all chains 〈i〉∞i=0 in S⊥ → T , the
following holds: (
⊔∞
i=0 i ) 
⊔∞
i=0 (i ).
Lemma 2 (monotonicity of ). The function  as given in Deﬁnition 32 is monotone, i.e., the following holds for all
i ,j ∈ S⊥ → T :
i  j ⇒ (i )  (j ).
Proof. Take arbitrary i ,j ∈ S⊥ → T . Let i  j . Then we need to prove that ∀s ∈ S⊥ : (i )(s)  (j )(s).
Take an arbitrary s ∈ S⊥. We need to prove that (i )(s)  (j )(s), i.e., that
ifW(b)(s) then ˆi (MP (s)) else {s} fi  ifW(b)(s) then ˆj (MP (s)) else {s} fi.
We distinguish three cases.
(1) Let W(b)(s) = ⊥W⊥ , then to prove: {⊥}  {⊥}. This is true by Deﬁnition 31.
(2) Let W(b)(s) = ff , then to prove: {s}  {s}. This is true by Deﬁnition 31.
14 The requirement of bounded non-determinism will in particular not be violated.
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(3) Let W(b)(s) = tt, then to prove: ˆi (MP (s))  ˆj (MP (s)). Let ′ = MP (s). Using the deﬁnition of
ˆ, we rewrite what needs to be proven into
⋃
s′∈′ i (s′) 
⋃
s′∈′ j (s′). Now we can distinguish two cases.
(a) Let ⊥ /∈ ⋃s′∈′ i (s′). Then to prove: ⋃s′∈′ i (s′) = ⋃s′∈′ j (s′). From the assumption that ⊥ /∈⋃
s′∈′ i (s′), we can conclude that ⊥ /∈ i (s′) for all s′ ∈ ′. Using the assumption that i (s)  j (s) for
all s ∈ S⊥, we have that i (s′) = j (s′) for all s′ ∈ ′ and therefore
⋃
s′∈′ i (s′) =
⋃
s′∈′ j (s′).
(b) Let ⊥ ∈ ⋃s′∈′ i (s′). Then to prove: (⋃s′∈′ i (s′)) \ {⊥} ⊆ ⋃s′∈′ j (s′), i.e., ⋃s′∈′(i (s′) \ {⊥}) ⊆⋃
s′∈′ j (s′). Using the assumption that i (s)  j (s) for all s ∈ S⊥, we have that for all s′ ∈ ′, either
i (s
′) \ {⊥} ⊆ j (s′) or i (s′) = j (s′), depending on whether ⊥ ∈ i (s). From this we can conclude that⋃
s′∈′(i (s′) \ {⊥}) ⊆
⋃
s′∈′ j (s′).
As we now have that  is monotone, proving continuity comes down to proving the following lemma. 










Proof. We have to prove that for all chains 〈i〉∞i=0 in S⊥ → T and for all s ∈ S⊥, the following holds:
((
⊔∞
i=0 i ))(s)  (
⊔∞







() else {s} fi 
∞⊔
i=0
ifW(b)(s) then ˆi () else {s} fi,
where  = MP (s). We distinguish three cases.
(1) Let W(b)(s) = ⊥W⊥ , then to prove: {⊥} 
⊔∞
i=0 {⊥}, i.e., {⊥}  {⊥}. This is true by Deﬁnition 31.
(2) Let W(b)(s) = ff , then to prove: {s} ⊔∞i=0 {s}, i.e., {s}  {s}. This is true by Deﬁnition 31.
(3) Let W(b)(s) = tt, then to prove: ˆ (⊔∞i=0 i )()  ⊔∞i=0 ˆi (). If we can prove that ∀ ∈ T : ˆ (⊔∞i=0 i )() ⊔∞
i=0 ˆi (), i.e.,ˆ(
⊔∞
i=0 i ) 
⊔∞
i=0 ˆi , we are ﬁnished. A proof of the continuity of ˆ is given in de Bakker [1],
from which we can conclude what needs to be proven. 
Proof of Theorem 2. Immediate from Lemmas 2 and 3 and fact 2. 
Appendix B. Theorem 3
Weprove the theoremusing techniques fromKuiper [9].Kuiper proves equivalenceof the operational anddenotational
semantics of a non-deterministic languagewith procedures but without a while construct. The proof involves structural
induction on programs.As the cases of sequential composition and non-deterministic choice have been proven byKuiper
(and as they can easily be adapted to ﬁt our language of meta-programs), we will only provide a proof for the atomic
meta-actions and for the while construct. For a detailed explanation of the general ideas of the proof, we refer to
Kuiper [9].
In our proof, we will use a number of lemmas from Kuiper or slight variations thereof. We restate those results here.
Lemma 4. Let W(b)(s) = tt. Then the following holds.
O(while b do P ′ od)(s) = O(P ′; while b do P ′ od)(s)
M(while b do P ′ od)(s) = M(P ′; while b do P ′ od)(s)
Lemma 5.
O(P ′; while b do P ′ od)(s) = O(while b do P ′ od) ◦ O(P ′)(s)
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Lemma 6. For all s ∈ S and P ∈ Prog for which C(P )(s) ∈ ℘(S+), C(P )(s) is a ﬁnite set.
We will now explain how the equivalence will be proven. The way to prove the equivalence result as was done by
Kuiper, is the following. In case Cm(P )(s) ∈ ℘(S+), induction on the sum of the lengths of the computation sequences
in Cm(P )(s) is applied, thus proving Om(P )(s) = M(P )(s) in this case 15 . In case there is an inﬁnite computation
sequence in C(P )(s) and so ⊥ ∈ O(P )(s), we prove O(P )(s) \ {⊥} ⊆ M(P )(s) by induction on the length of
individual computation sequences. This yields O(P )  M(P ). Proving M(P )  O(P ) by standard techniques then
completes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 3. O(P )(s) = M(P )(s) holds trivially for s = ⊥, so in the sequel we will assume s ∈ S.
1. O(P )(s)  M(P )(s).
Case A: ⊥ /∈ O(P )(s) i.e., C(P )(s) ∈ ℘(S+).
If C(P )(s) ∈ ℘(S+), then we prove O(P )(s) = M(P )(s) by cases, applying induction on the sum of the lengths
of the computation sequences.
(1) P ≡ execute.
Let (, ) ∈ S and  = a; ′, with ′ ∈ . If T (a, ) = ′ (which implies that a ∈ BasicAction), then the
following can be derived directly from Deﬁnitions 18, 16 and 32: O(execute)(, ) = (C(execute)(, )) =
{(′, ′)} = M(execute)(, ). If T (a, ) is undeﬁned—meaning that either a ∈ BasicAction and T (a, ) is
undeﬁned for this input, or a /∈ BasicAction—we have O(execute)(, ) = ∅ = M(execute)(, ).
(2) P ≡ apply().
The proof is similar to the proof for execute.
(3) P ≡ while b do P ′ od.
In case W(b)(s) = ff , we have that O(while b do P ′ od)(s) = {s} = M(while b do P ′ od)(s) by deﬁnition. In
the sequel, we will show that the equivalence also holds in case W(b)(s) = tt.
The function “length” yields the sum of the lengths of the computation sequences in a set. From the assumption
that C(P )(s) ∈ ℘(S+), we can conclude that C(P )(s) is a ﬁnite set (Lemma 6). From Deﬁnition 17, we can then
conclude the following.
length(C(P ′)(s)) < length(C(P ′; while b do P ′ od)(s)) < ∞
length(C(while b do P ′ od)((C(P ′)(s)))) < length(C(P ′; while b do P ′ od)(s)) < ∞
So, by induction we have:
O(P ′)(s) = M(P ′)(s),
O(while b do P ′ od)((C(P ′)(s))) = M(while b do P ′ od)((C(P ′)(s))).
The proof is then as follows.
O(while b do P ′ od)(s)
= O(P ′; while b do P ′ od)(s) (Lemma 4)
= O(while b do P ′ od) ◦ O(P ′)(s) (Lemma 5)
= O(while b do P ′ od)((C(P ′)(s))) (Deﬁnition 18)
= M(while b do P ′ od)((C(P ′)(s))) (Induction hypothesis)
= M(while b do P ′ od)(O(P ′)(s)) (Deﬁnition 18)
= M(while b do P ′ od) ◦ M(P ′)(s) (Induction hypothesis)
= M(P ′; while b do P ′ od)(s) (Deﬁnition 32)
= M(while b do P ′ od)(s) (Lemma 4)
15 In the sequel, we will omit the subscript “m” to C and O which is used to denote that we are dealing with the meta-language.
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Case B: ⊥ ∈ O(P )(s).
If P and s are such that ⊥ ∈ O(P )(s) then we prove by cases that O(P )(s)\{⊥} ⊆ M(P )(s), applying induction on
the length of the computation sequence corresponding to that outcome, i.e., we prove that for s′ = ⊥: s′ ∈ O(P )(s) ⇒
s′ ∈ M(P )(s)).
(1) P ≡ execute and P ≡ apply().
Equivalence was proven in case A.
(2) P ≡ while b do P ′ od.
Consider a computation sequence 	 = 〈s1, . . . , sn(= s′)〉 ∈ C(while b do P ′ od)(s). From Deﬁnition 17 of
the function C, we can conclude that there are intermediate states sj , sj+1 = ⊥ in this sequence 	, i.e., 	 =
〈s1, . . . , sj , sj+1, . . . , sn(= s′)〉 (where s1 can coincide with sj ), with sj = sj+1 and moreover: 〈s1, . . . , sj 〉 ∈
C(P ′)(s) and 〈sj+1, . . . , sn〉 ∈ C(while b do P ′ od)(sj ). The following can be derived immediately from the
above.
length(〈s1, . . . , sj 〉) < length(〈s1, . . . , sn〉)
length(〈sj+1, . . . , sn〉) < length(〈s1, . . . , sn〉)
We thus have the following induction hypothesis.
sj ∈ O(P ′)(s) ⇒ sj ∈ M(P ′)(s)
s′ ∈ O(while b do P ′ od)(sj ) ⇒ s′ ∈ M(while b do P ′ od)(sj )
As 〈s1, . . . , sj 〉 ∈ C(P ′)(s), we know that sj ∈ O(P ′)(s) (Deﬁnition 18) and similarly we can conclude that
s′ ∈ O(while b do P ′ od)(sj ). We thus have, using the induction hypothesis that: sj ∈ M(P ′)(s) and s′ ∈
M(while b do P ′ od)(sj ). From this we can conclude the following, deriving what was to be proven.
s′ ∈ M(P ′; while b do P ′ od)(s) (Deﬁnition 32)
s′ ∈ M(while b do P ′ od)(s) (Lemma 4)
2. M(P )(s)  O(P )(s)
(1) P ≡ execute.
Equivalence was proven in case (1).
(2) P ≡ apply().
Equivalence was proven in case (1).
(3) P ≡ while b do P ′ od.
We will use induction on the entity (i, length(P )) where length(P ) denotes the length of the statement P and we
use a lexicographic ordering on these entities, i.e., (i1, l1) < (i2, l2) iff either i1 < i2 or i1 = i2 and l1 < l2. Clearly,
length(P ′) < length(while b do P ′ od) holds. Therefore (i, length(P ′)) < (i, length(while b do P ′ od)) holds.
We know that M(while b do P ′ od) = 
 = ⊔∞i=0 i (⊥S⊥→T ) by continuity of  (Theorem 2). Let
i = i (⊥S⊥→T ). We thus need to prove that
⊔∞
i=0 i  O(while b do P ′ od). So, if we can prove that
i  O(while b do P ′ od) holds for all i, we will have the desired result. We will prove this by induction on the
entity (i, length(P )). As (i, length(P ′)) < (i, length(while b do P ′ od)) and (i, l) < (i + 1, l), our induction
hypothesis will be:
M(P ′)  O(P ′) and i  O(while b do P ′ od).
The induction basis is provided as 0 = ⊥S⊥→T  O(while b do P ′ od) holds. From this we have to prove that
for all s ∈ S : i+1(s)  O(while b do P ′ od)(s). Take an arbitrary s ∈ S. We have to prove that:
(i )(s)  O(while b do P ′ od)(s) i.e., by Deﬁnition 32
ˆi (M(P ′)(s))  O(while b do P ′ od)(s) i.e., by Lemmas 4 and 5
ˆi (M(P ′)(s))  O(while b do P ′ od)(O(P ′)(s)) (∗).
We know that M(P ′)(s) = O(P ′)(s) by the induction hypothesis and the fact that we have already proven
M(P ′)(s)  O(P ′)(s). Let ′ = M(P ′)(s) = O(P ′)(s) and let s′ ∈ ′. By the induction hypothesis, we
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have that i (s′)  O(while b do P ′ od)(s′) for all s′ ∈ S⊥. From this, we can conclude that
⋃
s′∈ i (s′) ⋃
s′∈O(while b do P ′ od)(s′) (see, the proof of Lemma 2), which can be rewritten into what was to be proven
(∗) using the deﬁnitions of ˆi and function composition. 
References
[1] J. de Bakker, Mathematical Theory of Program Correctness, Series in Computer Science, Prentice-Hall, London, 1980.
[2] M.E. Bratman, Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1987.
[3] P.R. Cohen, H.J. Levesque, Intention is choice with commitment, Artiﬁcial Intelligence 42 (1990) 213–261.
[4] M. Dastani, F.S. de Boer, F. Dignum, J.-J.Ch. Meyer, Programming agent deliberation—an approach illustrated using the 3APL language, in:
Proc. Second Internat. Joint Conf. on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS’03), Melbourne, 2003, pp. 97–104.
[5] H. Egli, A mathematical model for nondeterministic computations, Technical Report, ETH, Zürich, 1975.
[6] G.d. Giacomo, Y. Lespérance, H. Levesque, ConGolog, A concurrent programming language based on the situation calculus, Artiﬁcial
Intelligence 121 (1–2) (2000) 109–169.
[7] K.V. Hindriks, F.S. de Boer,W. van der Hoek, J.-J.Ch. Meyer,Agent programming in 3APL, Internat. J. ofAutonomousAgents and Multi-Agent
Systems 2 (4) (1999) 357–401.
[8] K. Hindriks, F.S. de Boer,W. van der Hoek, J.-J.Ch. Meyer, Control structures of rule-based agent languages, in: J. Müller, M.P. Singh,A.S. Rao
(Eds.), Proc. Fifth Internat. Workshop on Intelligent Agents V: Agent Theories, Architectures, and Languages (ATAL-98), Vol. 1555, Springer,
Heidelberg, Germany, 1999, pp. 381–396.
[9] R. Kuiper, An operational semantics for bounded nondeterminism equivalent to a denotational one, in: J.W. de Bakker, J.C. van Vliet (Eds.),
Proc. Internat. Symp. on Algorithmic Languages, North-Holland, 1981, pp. 373–398.
[10] P.D. Mosses, Denotational semantics, in: J. van Leeuwen (Ed.), Handbook of Theoretical Computer Science, Vol. B: Formal Models and
Semantics, Elsevier, Amsterdam, 1990, pp. 575–631.
[11] G. Plotkin, A structural approach to operational semantics, Technical Report, Aarhus University, Computer Science Department, 1981.
[12] A.S. Rao, AgentSpeak(L): BDI agents speak out in a logical computable language, in: W. van der Velde, J. Perram (Eds.), Agents Breaking
Away, Lecture Notes in Artiﬁcial Intelligence, Vol. 1038, Springer, Berlin, 1996, pp. 42–55.
[13] A.S. Rao, M.P. Georgeff, Modeling rational agents within a BDI-architecture, in: J. Allen, R. Fikes, E. Sandewall (Eds.), Proc. Second Internat.
Conf. on Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning (KR’91), Morgan Kaufmann, Los Altos, CA, 1991, pp. 473–484.
[14] M.B. van Riemsdijk, W. van der Hoek, J.-J.Ch. Meyer, Agent programming in Dribble: from beliefs to goals using plans, in: Proc. Second
Internat. joint Conf. on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS’03), Melbourne, 2003, pp. 393–400.
[15] M.B. van Riemsdijk, J.-J.Ch.Meyer, F.S. de Boer, Semantics of plan revision in intelligent agents, Technical Report, Utrecht University, Institute
of Information and Computing Sciences, UU-CS-2004-002, 2003.
[16] Y. Shoham, Agent-oriented programming, Artiﬁcial Intelligence 60 (1993) 51–92.
[17] J.E. Stoy, Denotational Semantics: The Scott-Strachey Approach to Programming Language Theory, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1977.
[18] R. Tennent, Semantics of Programming Languages, Series in Computer Science, Prentice-Hall, London, 1991.
[19] M. Wooldridge, Agent-based software engineering, IEEE Proc. Software Eng. 144 (1) (1997) 26–37.
[20] M. Wooldridge, P. Ciancarini, Agent-oriented software engineering: the state of the art, in: P. Ciancarini, M. Wooldridge (Eds.), First Internat.
Workshop on Agent-Oriented Software Engineering, Vol. 1957, Springer, Berlin, 2001, pp. 1–28.
